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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
20 of professional ethics looks with strong distaste
upon any attorney who publicizes his case. 4
Canon 20, however, has been ineffective.6 5 It not
only has lacked enforcement but also it is inade-
quate in its phrasing. Canon 20 does not provide
for news releases made by law enforcement officers,
nor for news releases made to the radio or televi-
sion media, nor does the canon strictly condemn all
or a particular type of publicity but merely states
that generally publicity is to be condemned. 66
A new Canon 20 is needed. Since the bar has
failed to enforce old Canon 20, enforcement of the
new canon should be placed in the bench. Should
the bench not wish to enforce the bar's ethics, the
bench should adopt its own rules to police officers
of the court who may divulge to news media
infbrmation prejudicial to the accused. In either
case, offenders could be cited for contempt.
The Criminal Court of Baltimore City, at one
time, codified its rules provisions to preclude the
divulgence of information prejudicial to the ac-
cused by officers of the court. The court's rule 904
stated:
"In connection with any case which may be
pending in the Criminal Court of Baltimore
or in connection with any person charged with
a crime and in the custody of the Police
Department of Baltimore City or other consti-
the prosecutor are, Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959),
and Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1959).
64 Canon 20-Newspaper Discussion of Pending
Litigation: -"Newspaper publications by A lax yer as to
pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a
fair trial in the courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned. If the extreme circumstance of a particular
case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofes-
sional to make it anonymously. An ex parle reference
to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the
records and papers on file in the court; but even in
extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parle state-
ments."
Cannons adopted by the American Bar Association
at its Thirty-First Annual Meeting at Seattle, Wash-
ington, August 27, 1908.
65 PHILLIPS & McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND
LAWYERS, Ch.VIII, (1952).
66 Id. at 162.
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Death Sentence for Kidnapping Following Life
Sentence for Murder Does Not Violate Due
Process-Petitioner was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, he
pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping the murder
victim, and he was sentenced to death. The Court
of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the
tuted authority, upon charges of crime over
which the Criminal Court of Baltimore has
jurisdiction, whether before or after indictment,
any of the following acts shall be subject to
punishment as contempt. . .:
C) The issuance by police authorities, the
State's Attorney, counsel for the defense,
or any other person having official connec-
tion with the case, of any statements or admis-
sions made by the accused, or other matters
bearing upon the issues to be tried.
D) The issuance of any statement or forecast
as to the future course of action of either the
prosecuting authorities or the defense relative
to the conduct of the trial.""
These rules do not apply to the press but affect
only the sources of information that are within the
court's power to control. The rules did not prevent
all disclosures of police operations nor of court
procedures, nor do they affect all sources of
information. Nevertheless, as with the canons of
ethics, the effectiveness of court rules depends
on their enforcement. The Baltimore Court rules
were repealed shortly after the Baltimore Radio
case.6
Lastly, some hope for the future may be gained
in educating the press in the evils of trial by news-
paper in hope that good conscience will bring
greater professional responsibility, which can
only lead to self restraint.69
6 Par. C & D, Rule 904, Supreme Bench of Balti-
more City, 1947. Also cited in State v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
6 The court's resolution reads:
"The repeal of this Rule 904 shall not be con-
strued to impair the power of the judges, from
time to time assigned to the Criminal Court of
Baltimore City, to punish for contempt."
No press informant was prosecuted under Rule 904 nor
the resolution repealing it. Letter From Chief Judge
Emory H. Niles to Author, September 3, 1959.
6 This problem was discussed by newsmen attending
the Northwestern University Short Course for Newsmen
in Crime Reporting, Evanston, Illinois, March 23
through March 27, 1959. The course was sponsored by
the Northwestern University Schools of Law andjournalism.
RECENT CASES
conviction and sentence. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting peti-
tioner's argument that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Williams v). Oklahoma, 358
U.S. 576 (1959).
The petitioner argued first that the trial court
[Vol. 50
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violated statutory pre-sentencing procedure by
permitting the state's attorney to make an un-
sworn statement concerning the details of the
crime and petitioner's criminal record, and deny-
ing petitioner the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination. The Supreme Court decided,
however, that petitioner had waived his rights by
failing to demand a hearing and by admitting the
truth of the statements made against him.
Petitioner next contended that he would be
punished twice for the same offense, inasmuch as
the trial court had considered the murder in im-
posing sentence on the kidnapping charge. The
Court held, however, that since kidnapping and
murder were separate offenses under Oklahoma
law, the trial judge was required to consider all
the circumstances of the crime in determining
punishment. Furthermore, it was noted, peti-
tioner had not objected to the kidnapping charge
on the grounds of former jeopardy but instead had
entered a plea of guilty.
Petitioner urged, finally, that the lesser offense
of kidnapping was merged in the greater offense
of murder, and that the life sentence imposed for
murder was a bar to the imposition of a greater
sentence for kidnapping. The Court held, however,
that the state had denominated kidnapping and
murder as separate crimes, and that due process
does not "require a State to fix or impose any
particular penalty for any crime it may define, or
impose the same or 'proportionate' sentences for
separate and independent crimes."
New York Motion Picture Censorship Statute
Declared Unconstitutional-After previous at-
tempts at motion picture censorship had been de-
clared unconstitutional, New York passed a new
censorship law designed to meet the objections of
the United States Supreme Court. The statute
barred the exhibition of motion pictures which
were "immoral" in that they portrayed acts of
sexual immorality as desirable, acceptable, or
proper patterns of behavior. Under the statute,
the Motion Picture Division of the New York
Education Department denied a license for the
exhibition of the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover."
The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the
denial of the license to exhibit, interpreting the
statute to require the denial of a license to a
motion picture which portrays immoral conduct,
in this case adultery, as right and desirable con-
duct for certain people under certain circum-
stances. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that advocacy of conduct
proscribed by law does not justify denial of free
speech when such advocacy falls short of incite-
ment. Kingsley International Pictures Corporation
v. Regents of the University of the State of New
York, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4492 (U.S. June 29, 1959).
The Court carefully avoided deciding whether
any form of prior restraint on the exhibition of
motion pictures is constitutional. However, the
majority felt that "the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and pun-
ishment for violation of the law, not abridgement
of the rights of free speech." Justices Black and
Douglas in a concurring opinion, argued that all
prior censorship of motion pictures is unconstitu-
tional. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the
result, thought that the statute was constitutional
but was unconstitutionally applied to the picture
sought to be exhibited. He criticized the majority
for striking down "the New York legislation in
order to escape the task of deciding whether a
particular picture is entitled to the protection of
expression under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Clark, concurring in the result, thought
that the standard set forth in the New York
statute was vague and hence unconstitutional.
The New York legislature is left with the task of
deciding whether any censorship statute can
survive constitional objection.
Conviction of Murder in Second Degree Is
Bar to Subsequent Prosecution for Murder in
First Degree Despite Granting of Motion for
New Trial-Petitioner was found guilty of murder
in the second degree. Upon his motion, a new trial
was granted, and at this trial he was convicted of
murder in the first degree. Upon appeal, the
Supreme Court of Washington reversed the con-
viction and remanded the cause for a new trial,
holding that the jury verdict finding defendant
guilty of murder in the second degree operated as
an acquittal of the crime of murder in the first
degree, and that the second trial thus placed
petitioner in double jeopardy in violation of his
rights under the state constitition. State v. Schoel,
341 P.2d 481 (Wash. 1959).
The prosecution contended that defendant's
successful rhotion for a new trial operated as a
waiver of his right to rely upon the first verdict as
an acquittal of the more serious offense. The court
rejected this contention, reasoning that if upon an
acquittal in a fair trial, a defendant cannot be
placed in jeopardy again for the same offense, the
19591
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same policy should protect him from a second
jeopardy when he has been acquitted of a charge
after a trial in which prejudicial error occurred.
The court could see no reason why petitioner
should be required to waive a valid defense in
order to assert his constitutional right to appeal
his conviction of a lesser crime which he alleged
to be the result of error. This decision marks a
retreat from previous holdings in the jurisdiction
and is close to the position taken by the United
States Supreme Court in Green v. United States,
335 U.S. 184 (1957).
Court Has Duty to Answer Questions of Jury
Regarding Elements of Various Related Of-
fenses-Petitioner was convicted of first degree
murder for the shooting of the operator of a re-
tail liquor store during an attempted robbery and
was sentenced to death. The jury was confused as
to the elements of felony murder and murder in
the second degree, and as to the relationship
between robbery and attempted robbery and the
possible homicide verdicts. The trial judge re-
fused to answer questions addressed to him by
the foreman of the jury, offering only to repeat his
blanket charge to the jury. The Court of Appeals
of New York reversed, holding that the requested
clarification should have been given and that if the
court failed to understand the questions of the
jury, it was obliged to direct further inquiry to
them to ascertain their difficulties. People v. Miller,
160 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 1959).
Upon appeal, petitioner contended that the
jury could have returned a verdict of murder in
the first degree with a recommendation for leniency
under the statute involved, but that under the
charge given, without further explanation, it
appeared that a recommendation of leniency was
possible only upon a verdict of felony murder. The
appellate court concluded that since the jury
might, under the statute, "fit its verdict to the
varying degrees of moral guilt" the trial judge's
refusal to answer questions regarding possible
verdicts was prejudicial error.
A further assignment of error involved the ad-
mission of testimony that the deceased had a wife
and seven children. The statement was thought to
be "calculated to appeal to the prejudice and
sympathy of the jury." The Court of Appeals
concluded that such testimony was improperly
admitted since "the moral guilt of the defendant,
not the moral goodness of the deceased" was the
proper basis for the jury's verdict.
Prosecution for Aiding and Abetting Precluded
if Woman Herself Performs Surgical Abortion-
Defendant was convicted of the abortion of a
woman who was ten weeks pregnant. No direct
evidence was offered at the trial to prove that
petitioner had committed the abortion, but there
was testimony to the effect that the victim, unclad
from waist to knees, was present in his apartment
where she fainted, and that petitioner, aided by
his girl friend, clothed the victim and took her,
while unconscious, to the entrance of her apart-
ment. An autopsy disclosed that the victim died
of a rpassive inter-abdominal hemorrhage caused
by two perforations of her uterus. Instructions
were given to the jury that, even if petitioner were
absent from his apartment when the abortion was
performed, he could be found guilty of aiding and
abetting the commission of the abortion. The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
reversed, holding that the jury might have found
that the woman herself had performed the abor-
tion. Upon this finding a verdict against defendant
would have been precluded, since the woman
upon whom an abortion is performed is considered
the victim and not the criminal under New Jersey
law. Thus there would not have been a principal
nor a crime which petitioner could aid or abet.
State v. Thompson, 153 A.2d 364 (N.J. App. Div.
1959).
The pertinent New Jersey statute provided that:
Any person who, maliciously or without lawful
justification, with intent to cause or procure
the miscarriage of a pregnant woman, admin-
isters or prescribes or advises or directs her to
take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or
noxious thing, or uses any instrument whatsoeer,
is guilty of a high misdemeanor. (Emphasis
added.)
Interpreting the statute, the court insisted that,
since the "prescribe, advise or direct" clause refers
only to "any poison, drug, medicine or noxious
thing," the petitioner could be found guilty of the
crime of abortion only if he were found to have
used the instrument which perforated the victim's
uterus. Thus lack of presence in the apartment at
the time of the abortion was a valid defense, and
"if the jury understood from the charge that he
could be convicted, although absent, no vestige of
defense remained."
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 403 and 429)
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